Release 0.8.0 with replay-safe prioritized transport

typescript/docs/SECURITY.md

@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ is not accepted as an authenticated application result.
 
 Session nonces are replay-checked on both peers, including pushes. A bounded
 4096-position window supports responses completed out of order and rejects replay
-or excessively stale traffic. Send nonces and transport IDs do not wrap. Nonce
+or excessively stale traffic by silently discarding those packets, without closing
+the session. A discarded response leaves the pending call waiting for a valid reply
+or its timeout/cancellation. Replay state uses a circular bitmap; unauthenticated
+packets never advance it. Kotlin bounds local priority overtaking to 2730 nonce
+positions and serializes nonce allocation, sealing and queue admission. Send nonces and transport IDs do not wrap. Nonce
 state used during identity exchange is preserved when the identity is completed.
 
 The routing envelope still allows denial of service by an active carrier: packets
@@ -79,7 +83,8 @@ silently invent a key provisioning or trust-on-first-use policy.
 
 - `test/security.test.mjs`: swapped responses reject; wrong pin, version/role/token
   signature substitution, forged/mismatched finished, expired/tampered server Seal,
-  damaged/replayed packets, altered call IDs/kinds/priorities fail closed.
+  damaged packets and altered call IDs/kinds/priorities fail closed; duplicates
+  and stale packets are discarded without executing again or closing the session.
 - Kotlin `AuthenticatedEnvelopeTest`: normal signed duplex and session identities,
   response-ID swap, call-to-push rewrite, priority rewrite, replay, forged Unit
   acknowledgement and protocol downgrade.